

European Commission Proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse

VIDEO GAMES EUROPE Position

February 2023

1. Every child has the right to be respected, protected and empowered online and offline. Children have the right to play, to create and to actively participate in the community through digital inclusion and, importantly, children have the right to protection and privacy.
2. With more than 52% of Europe's population playing video games across all age groups, and with playing video games being a popular pastime for children, the video game industry is committed to a fun and safe video game play environment.
3. Online video game play is among the safest online activities that children can participate in.¹ Most video games do not allow interactivity outside the game play environment, and the in-game communications, i.e. chat functionality, utilise a range of tools to protect players, depending on the risk. Developed over a period of more than twenty years, the video game sector has a solid framework prioritising minor protection, based on its commitment to keep online gameplay interaction free from illegal content and content that may be inappropriate for children.
4. This paper explains (i) what type of online interactions occur in videogames, (ii) how the video game industry prioritises children's online safety, and (iii) our recommendations to the Commission's proposal.

What type of online interactions occur in video game play?

5. The purpose of in-game communications is to allow players to collaborate, to talk about the game play and to replicate the feel of playing physically with friends but in an online environment. Communications between players in video games are typically restricted, ephemeral, filtered, reportable, pseudonym-based and can be deleted and turned off.
 - **In-game communication** features are largely text based but can also include voice chat. In-game communication with other players facilitates collaboration and conversation about game play, and enhances the game-playing experience; e.g. discussing strategies. These communications tend to be short. Furthermore, they often take the form of real time chat that is visible (or audible) to all the players of the game. It is rare that in-game communications allow for photos and videos to be exchanged, or indeed, offer the technical possibility to do so. For some companies, this is prohibited in their terms and conditions.
 - **At video game platform level**, additional communications features may be offered but, in the majority of cases, these features are used to share image and video captures of the gameplay itself.²
 - **In-game communication is different to adjacent communication tools.** Separate communication companies, such as Discord, offering communication tools, are entirely separate to the video


¹ Annex Reports and studies.

² Where the sharing of user-generated content via photos, video or streamed content is permitted, Proactive Image Detection such as PhotoDNA is typically used, which is a robust image hash detection technology allowing operators to reliably identify and remove known CSAM

game companies. These tools are not provided by the video game publisher or the platform on which the game is played and are therefore not under their control. Such adjacent communication services allow for exchanges during gameplay but not within the game environment. They are dedicated communication platforms, which is their main purpose, and should be approached as such.

How does the video games industry prioritise children’s online safety?

6. Because of the popularity of video games among children, the sector committed early on in its history to a safe gameplay experience. Developed over a period of more than twenty years, the video game sector has a solid framework to prioritise safe online gameplay, for both adults and children based on its commitment to keep online gameplay interaction free from illegal content and content that may be inappropriate for children. Members take various actions and employ a number of tools that have been in place for many years, and that are best practice examples for other sectors. Together, these tools constitute a **safety-by-design** approach also when in-game communications are involved.



- i. **Age-appropriate content:** The Pan European Game Information System (PEGI) ensures that a video game is assessed according to its age appropriateness based on criteria used by independent evaluators including, for example, bad language, violence or sexually explicit content. Following this evaluation, an age rating is attributed to the game. This enables parents to choose a game that is appropriate for the child. PEGI is a voluntary, and in some countries, a co-regulatory system adopted into national law. Currently 38 countries use the PEGI system.

- ii. **A Code of Conduct:** In addition to receiving age ratings for their games, video game companies are contractually bound by the PEGI Code of Conduct. Article 9 of the Code introduced in 2007, **focuses on safe online gameplay environments** where online

interaction is offered. It stipulates that signatories should keep any user-generated content free of content which is *“illegal, offensive, racist, degrading, corrupting, threatening, obscene or that might permanently impair the development of minors”*. The Code also requires appropriate reporting mechanisms to be in place to allow players to notify such content or any type of inappropriate conduct.

- iii. **Tools and safeguards:** A variety of tools and safeguards are used to protect minors from potentially harmful or illegal content. In the game itself, where communication between players is possible the player may typically have access to tools that allow reporting, blocking and muting, among other functions. Filtering, including proactive filtering, is commonly used, such as profanity filters and tools that obfuscate links to third party sites. Depending on the nature of the service, moderation tools are often deployed and human moderation is used to identify and to remove harmful content, and to remove and report illegal content to law enforcement. For some video game specific UGC platforms, which are platforms on which users can upload their own game creations, pre-moderation of text chats is used for games that are particularly popular with children, where, for example, private information is hashed out prior to upload, as children may not always understand the risks associated

with sharing contact details. **Parental control tools** enable parents to restrict communication with others both in-game and at platform level to ensure that children are protected from, for example, solicitation from unknown players³. These tools can be used on the web or within mobile apps, as well as on console, to further facilitate ease of use by parents and guardians. On some platforms, when parents permit communication with other players in the game, parents can still pre-approve communications requests from existing friends of the child. On some platforms, a parent can permit the child to use communication features in one game without affecting the setting that blocks communication in all other games played by the child (“whitelisting”), which gives parents the ability to choose what is right for their child. Many platforms and online games have established **community guidelines** that set out expectations for appropriate player behaviour in their online ecosystem and provide information on the recourse that may be taken in the event of violation of guidelines.

- iv. **Cooperation with law enforcement:** Where illegal content is detected, either via user reports or through moderation systems, member companies will remove content, review it and escalate to law enforcement. Individual member companies of VIDEO GAMES EUROPE cooperate directly with civil society organisations such as INHOPE, ECPAT, NCMEC (as a proxy for law enforcement) and WePROTECT.
- v. **Awareness and Education:** Educational efforts aimed at players of all ages, parents and educators are crucial and a major component to achieve safe online environments. VIDEO GAMES EUROPE and members have put in place initiatives across Europe in national languages providing information about tools, tips, and suitable games, to ensure that parents are aware of what is available to manage their child’s online activity and game play to ensure that it is safe⁴. The most effective way to ensure online safety is that governments support industry initiatives that focus on education and awareness raising.

Comments on the proposal

- 7. A safe online gameplay experience is a key priority for the video games industry and our sector is committed to the European Commission’s goal to fight child sexual abuse online effectively.
- 8. Successful regulation should allow for clear reporting requirements applicable to all providers who become aware (actual knowledge) of potential child sexual abuse on their platforms. Where additional obligations are deemed necessary, these should be proportionate in relation to the risk that the particular communication service may pose and ensure that their interference with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection remains lawful.

Considering the low prevalence of CSAM and solicitation in in-game communications, and the limited opportunities to share images and videos in such exchanges, and the nature of such exchanges, VIDEO GAMES EUROPE is concerned that the proposal goes beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate and therefore could negatively impact the essence of the rights guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Such intrusion would constitute an interference with the confidentiality of communications that does not comply with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the

³ According to a recent Ipsos [survey](#) 60% of parents do not allow children to play multiplayer online games. Among the 40 % of parents that do allow exchanges with other players, 80 % of parents supervise the online interactivity.

⁴ [Responsible Gameplay - ISFE](#) ; [ISFE-EGDF Call-for-feedback-BIK-Strategy-28-10-2021.pdf](#)

Charter⁵. The complementary impact assessment of the European Parliament Research Service⁶ cautioned that the proposed measures can also negatively impact the fundamental rights of children as users of online services which will impact their personal development and space to develop. VIDEO GAMES EUROPE therefore urges caution against a one-size-fits-all approach that treats games and in-game communications like other, higher-risk digital platforms, or imposes the same expectations on companies, regardless of risk.

9. The Commission itself in Recital 5 of the proposal states that *“given the inherent differences between the various relevant information society services covered by this Regulation and the related varying risks that those services are misused for the purpose of online child sexual abuse and varying ability of the providers concerned to prevent and combat such abuse, the obligations imposed on the providers of those services should be differentiated in an appropriate manner”*.
10. As recognised by a number of reports and studies (see the Annex to this proposal), online video games where these include the ability to communicate with others, are some of the safest places for children to be connected to the internet, in particular because of the minor and ancillary feature of such communications and the specific nature of such in-game communications, which are largely text based, but also because of the many tools and safeguards in place, as detailed in the previous section allowing to disable such communication, efficient reporting tools, filtering and moderation.
11. Despite the stated intention of the Regulation to apply differentiated obligations, the definitions in the proposal are tied to a number of obligations which do not consider the nature of the service, nor the prevalence of harmful content of a service being misused. VIDEO GAMES EUROPE therefore recommends that the proposal for a Regulation considers the following seven points:
 12. **Proportionate obligations according to the nature of service and prevalence of misuse:**
 - The definition of interpersonal communications services in Article 2(b), supplemented by Recital 5, triggers disproportionate risk assessment obligations under Article 3, risk mitigation measures under Article 4 and risk reporting obligations under Article 5 for in-game communications/chats, where they are ancillary to the core service.
 - These services are most often text based, do not allow the exchange of images and videos, and are not suited for long conversations as they are focussed on game play and open to all. Because of their nature, they are at low risk of being misused for child sexual abuse, whether for the purpose of exchanging material or for the solicitation of children. The encompassing definition in the proposal is at odds with the intention that *“the obligations imposed on the providers of those services should be differentiated in an appropriate manner”* (Recital 5). As stated in Recital 12, child sexual abuse material *“typically consists of images or videos”*.
 - Therefore, proportionate obligations should apply to interpersonal communications services and hosting services that do not allow user uploaded photo or video sharing and that are ancillary to the core service. These should be subject to the general reporting obligations in Articles 12 and 13, but not to the obligations listed in Articles 3, 4 and 5 due to the nature of the service and the low prevalence of misuse.
 13. **The EU should continue the ability to ensure voluntary detection of unknown material and the solicitation of children**

⁵ [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union \(europa.eu\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:60924/2000)

⁶ [Proposal for a regulation laying down the rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse - Complementary impact assessment](#) - European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2023, p 84.

In light of the concerns raised by the EDPB and EDPS in their joint Opinion^[1] regarding (i) interference with the protection of fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data, and (ii) the nascent state of technologies available to deal with new CSAM and the solicitation of children which - according to the joint opinion - remains insufficiently developed and inaccurate, the Proposal should continue, not discontinue, the voluntary use of technologies for the detection of Child Sexual Abuse Online, as called for in the joint Opinion. The added value that the current interim regulation brings in allowing voluntary measures, subject to safeguards, to combat and prevent Child Sexual Abuse Online should continue to exist.

14. **Support the development of technologies that can address child sexual abuse online in a lawful manner:** Considering the nascent state of technologies available to deal with new CSAM and the solicitation of children, and as stated in the joint EDPB-EDPS opinion^[2], the Commission should encourage the development of technological solutions to ensure that providers have a variety of robust solutions to choose from, to address detection of unknown material and the solicitation of children. As existing technologies to detect new content and grooming are of low accuracy (compared to the technologies to detect known CSAM), deploying these would result in an increase in reported content and a reduction in accuracy, thereby substantially impacting law enforcement agencies workload.
15. **Parental control tools should be recognised as a form of age assurance.** The obligation to use age verification and age assessment measures to 'reliably' identify child users on their services (*Article 4.3*) does not take into account the limited tools currently available on the market. Some of these tools rely on methods which themselves raise privacy concerns or may result in over-blocking such as the exclusion of young-looking adults from accessing online services. Parental controls are a form of account confirmation that give functional age assurance. In this context, VIDEO GAMES EUROPE welcomes the recommendation in the joint EDPB-EDPS Opinion to expressly allow providers to rely on parental control mechanisms in addition, or as an alternative, to age verification.⁷
16. **The EU should look at how global coordination can be ensured** by harmonising existing standards and obligations on CSAM detection and removal at international level while maintaining a high level of protection.
17. **The need for harmonised data on trends:** Public entities that receive reports of CSAM should publish this data annually to allow for the better understanding of trends, of how overall efforts of stakeholders are producing positive results, and to better target additional measures that may be required.

---ANNEX - Reports and studies

- a 2020 [survey](#) commissioned by the UK's regulator, Ofcom and the ICO, of ca 4000 adults and children aged between 12 and 15, reported that 62% of adults and 81% of children had experienced potential online harms in the previous 12 months. Compared to other digital platforms sources (social media,

^[1][joint Opinion 04/2022 on the draft proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse \(CSAM\)](#), §19-21.

^[2]*Ibid.*, §76, 91

⁷ [joint Opinion 04/2022 on the draft proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse \(CSAM\)](#), §92.

instant messaging, video sharing), gaming sites and platforms were the least cited by respondents for potential harms, with 2% of adults and 3% of children experiencing such harms via online gameplay.

- a 2020 [Interpol](#) report highlighted increases in CSEAM-sharing via P2P and in exchanges and discussions on the darknet, that viral distribution had increased on social media, and viral video circulation via messaging apps. As regards video game platforms, countries reported “*no significant changes in the volume of cases (reported) of children being targeted by sexual offenders*”.
- NCMEC’s 2021 [Cybertipline report by Electronic Service Providers](#) showed that CSAM and grooming instances for video game companies were considerably lower than other platforms that have as their primary purpose photo/video sharing and communications features.
- The Radicalisation Awareness Network 2020 [conclusions paper](#) stated that that grooming and extremist content is rare in in-game communications but is more frequent on adjacent gaming communications platforms.

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About VIDEO GAMES EUROPE

[Europe’s video games industry - VIDEOGAMES EUROPE](#)

VIDEO GAMES EUROPE comprises national trade associations covering 18 countries throughout Europe which represent in turn hundreds of games companies at national level. VIDEO GAMES EUROPE also has as direct members the leading European and international publishers, many of which have studios with a strong European footprint, which produce and publish interactive entertainment and educational software for use on personal computers, game consoles, portable devices, mobile phones and the Internet.

The video games industry represents one of Europe’s most compelling economic success stories, relying on a strong IP framework, and is a rapidly growing segment of the creative industries. The European digital single market area is the third-largest market for video games globally. All in all, there are around 5,000 game developer studios and publishers in Europe, employing over 98,000 people.